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Introduction 
Canada and the United States are the world's largest 
trading partners. The total volume of two-way 
merchandise trade in 1985 was $165 billion Ca-
nadian ($124 billion U.S.). Canadian dependence 
on U.S. markets has grown to the point that nearly 
80% of our exports are destined for our southern 
neighbor. By the same token, more than 70% of 
Canada's imports originate in the U.S. That volume 
represents 20% of total exports from the U.S., the 
largest proportion going to any individual country. 
Obviously, trade relations between Canada and the 
U.S. are very important to both countries. Indeed, 
given their combined role in total world trade, the 
importance of trade relations between them goes 
beyond whatever it might be to those two countries 
alone. 
Trade relationships between Canada and the U.S. 
have been changing over the past few years and may 
be on the threshold of even greater changes in the 
next few months. I am referring to the expected 
outcome of the current bilateral negotiations which 
have become a focal point for any discussion of this 
topic. Given their importance and the dynamic state 
of these trade relationships, it is'highly appropriate 
that they should be considered in a forum such as 
this. This paper will briefly examine some of the 
features of Canada-U.S. trade, the issues and 
environment of the current trade talks, and a few of 
the likely implications of free trade, if that is where 
we are going. Emphasis will be on agriculture. It is 
to be hoped that we will be able to identify a few 
areas where further research is warranted. 
Canada-U.S. Trade 
As already noted, Canada and the United States have 
the largest bilateral trading relationship in the 
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world. In fact, according to Fry, the U.S. exports 
more to the Province of Ontario than to Japan and 
more to British Columbia than to China. That is 
why Canadians are often a little chagrined to hear 
U.S. spokesmen refer to some country other than 
Canada as their most important trading partner. To 
Canadians, it is a clear sign of being taken for 
granted by the U.S. This is one of the intangibles 
that affects trade relations because it influences how a 
country acts or reacts. 
If we examine a profile of our merchandise trade, 
we find that by far the most important component in 
both directions of that two-way flow is automotive 
products under the agreement known as the auto pact 
negotiated in 1965. These products represent about 
one-third of the total value of trade in each 
direction. Resource based industries figure 
prominently in exports to the U.S. with forestry and 
petroleum products ranked second and third 
followed by metal and chemical products which are 
based, at least in part, on other natural resources. 
Agriculture and food exports to the U.S. ranked 
sixth in importance in 1984 with only 4% of total 
merchandise trade (Table 1). 
Among Canadian imports from the U.S., agri-
culture and food ranks fourth in importance after 
automotive products, chemicals and computers. The 
agriculture and food trade of both countries is more 
geographically dispersed than the average of mer-
chandise trade between them. This, of course, re-
flects the predominance of grains and oilseeds in the 
agricultural trade of each and underscores a 
measure of competition for third markets for these 
products. Nevertheless, the U.S. still supplies more 
than half of Canada's total imports of agriculture 
and food products and absorbs nearly one-third of 
our agricultural exports. A profile of agricultural 
trade by major commodities is shown in Table 2. 
Although it is generally not the case in agricul-
ture and food products, (see Table 3) and only 
recently in other products, Canada currently enjoys a 
surplus in merchandise trade with the U.S. This 
surplus is usually outweighed by the deficit in ser- 64     October 19*7  NJARE 
Table 1.     Canada — United States Merchandise Trade, 1984
  Value  U.S. As  Share 
  of % of  Bilateral
Product Group  Trade Total  Trade 
  (Billion Can.)  (%>  (%) 
Exports       
Automotive 28.7 97.8 34.7
Forest Products  11.2 74.2  13.5
Petroleum, and Natural Gas  8.3 99.8  10.0
Fabricated and Metal       
Products  7.6 80.5  9.2
Chemical and Chemical       
Products 3.5 65.7 4.2





Office Eq.  2.7 72.1  3.3
Industrial Mach.  2.1 74.5  2.5
All Other Items  15.2 53.2  18.4
Totals  82.8 75.6  100.0
Imports       
Automotive  22.9 86.7  33.4
Chemicals  4.1 78.1  6.0
Computers  3.8 91.4  5.5
Agriculture and Food  3.2 53.8  4.7
Industrial Machinery  2.9 71.9  4.2
All Other Items  31.6 —  46.1
Totals  68.5  71.5  100.0 
Source: External Affairs Canada Canadian Access to Export Markets. Canadian Foreign Policy Series. November 1985. 
vices and capital flows, normally leaving Canada 
with a current account deficit. 
Both countries are known as trading nations. But, 
in relative terms, Canada is much more exposed to 
international markets than is the U.S. For example, 
Canadian merchandise exports are equivalent in 
value to about 30% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) while the corresponding figure for the U.S. is 
closer to 10%. Similar proportions apply to imports. 
With respect to agriculture, Canadian exports are 
equivalent in value to about 45% of the total farm 
cash receipts versus about 20% as a corresponding 
measure in the United States. Canadian imports of 
agriculture and food products correspond in value to 
30% of the farm cash receipts. Again, that figure is 
much smaller in the U.S. where imports represent 
about 14% of the value of farm cash receipts. As a 
further measure of the international exposure of 
Canadian agriculture, it is reported by Gifford (p. 
13) that "close to 70% of Canadian agricultural 
production is priced on an international basis." 
In general, then, while trade is important to both 
countries, it may be argued that Canada has con-
siderably more at stake in these negotiations. The 
relative potential for gain is enhanced by the much 
larger U.S. market; but the importance of exports to 
the Canadian economy, combined with the heavy 
dependence on the U.S., means the potential losses 
are also great if that market should be lost. 
Trade Issues and Environment 
For the past 13 months, our trade representatives 
have been negotiating a comprehensive, bilateral 
trade agreement. These talks were initiated by a 
letter from Prime Minister Mulroney to President 
Reagan in September 1985, following their earlier 
discussion of the subject at the "Shamrock Sum-
mit" in Quebec City in March of that year. Fol-
lowing actions by both governments to permit the 
talks to proceed on a "fast-track" schedule, ne-
gotiations got underway in May of 1986. Under the 
fast-track arrangement, a proposed agreement must 
be presented to Congress by October for signing by 
the President by January 3, 1988, after which 
Congress may approve or reject the package without 
change. Approval or rejection in Canada could be 
merely a Cabinet decision but is likely to be 
debated in Parliament. 
With regard to the scope of these negotiations, Coffin  U.S.—-Canada Trade Relationships     65 
 
Table 2.  Canadian—U.S. Agricultural Trade by Selected, Commodity Groups 1985 
  Exports to Imports from
Commmodity Group  U.S.  U.S. Balance
    ($ Canadian Millions)   
Grain and Grain       
Products  273  265 8
Oilseeds and
products  113  386 (273)
Live Animals  394  71 323
Meats 630 155 475
Other Animal Products  119  236 (117)
Dairy Products  15  16 (1)
poultry and Eggs  31  104 (73)
Vegetables and 
Potatoes  144  576 (432)
Fruits and Nuts  77  811 (734)
Beverages 523 64 459
Sugar and Related       
products  125  49 76
Total Agr. Products  2,974  3,515  (541) 
Source: Agriculture Canada, Canada's Trade in Agricultural Products, Publication No. 86/2, August 1986. 
it has been understood from the beginning that they 
were to include all sectors of the economy. Ne-
gotiators on both sides have maintained their de- 
& 
termination to keep as much as possible on the 
negotiating table. The chief negotiators have recently 
reinforced their aim of achieving a comprehensive 
agreement when they declared that they want "« big 
deal or no deal". This approach is consistent with 
article 24 of GATT which requires that a substantial 
part of all trade be included in order to meet the 
definition and exemptions for a free trade area. 
What, then, are the issues that have brought us to 
the negotiating table in the first place? As observed 
by Wonnacott, the reasons are not identical on both 
sides of the border. But since Canada has been the 
initiator of the talks, it is appropriate tc look at the 
issues from that perspective. A suitable starting point 
is the stated objectives of the nego- 
Table 3.    Canadian Agricultural Trade 
Balances With the United States, 1965-1985 
Period  Exports to U.S.       Imports from U.S.       Balance 
  (Billions of Current $ Canadian) 
1965-69  0.27                              0.59                     (0.32)
1970-74                0.42                           1.00                         (0.58)
1976-80                    0.83                                 2.36                     (1.52)
1981-85           1.86                      3.30                         (1.44)
1986              2.66                       3.64                      (0.98)
Source: Agriculture Canada, Handbook of Selected Agricultural 
Statistics, (Various issues) 
tiations from Canada's point of view, as reported by 
External Affairs: 
1. Secure access to U.S. markets through limits or 
exemption on the applications of trade 
remedy laws and clearer definition of coun-
tervailable subsidies. 
2.  Enhanced access to U.S. markets through 
elimination of tariffs and quotas and liber-
alization of government procurement policies 
and other non-tariff barriers. 
3.  Enshrined access to U.S. markets through 
improved dispute settlement mechanisms and 
institutional provisions that recognize mutual 
obligations and accommodate differences and 
the independence of the two governmental 
systems. 
The order in which these objectives are stated is 
significant. Ordinarily one might expect that the 
primary purpose of trade talks is to reduce existing 
barriers (enhance access). The fact that this objec-
tive takes second place in these talks reflects both 
the relatively low level of those barriers and the 
threat of reversal through growing protectionism in 
the U.S. It reflects a general deterioration in trade 
relations between our two countries in the recent 
past, and the concern in Canada about in-
discriminate application of trade remedy laws by 
the U.S. 
We'll return to the issue of secure access in a 
moment. But first it is convenient to consider briefly 
the existing impediments to trade in the form of 66    October 1987 
Table 4.    Canadian and U.S. Tariffs for 
Selected Industrial Products, 1987 
Category  Canada    U.S. 
    (%)   
Textiles  16.9  7.2
Clothing  23.7  18.4
Footwear  21.5    9.0
Furniture and Fixtures  14.3  4.6
Paper Products  6.6  0.0
Chemicals  7.9  0.6
Glass Products  6.9    5.7
Iron and Steel  5.1  2.7
Metal Products  8.6  4.0
Rubber Products  7.3  3.2
Electrical Machinery  7.5  4.5
Transportation  0.0    0.0
Source: Adapted from: Wonnacott, Paul. The United States and 
Canada: The Quest for Free Trade. Institute for International 
Economics. Washington, D.C. March 1987. (Table 1.1, p. 4) 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers to gain some appre-
ciation of the potential for enhanced access. 
With respect to tariffs, most trade between Canada 
and the U.S. is already relatively duty-free. In fact, 
more than two-thirds of that trade bears no tariff and 
by the end of this year at least 90% of the total trade 
between the two countries will face tariffs of 5% or 
less. While sizable tariffs remain on a few items, they 
are not generally a major issue. Nevertheless, it is 
expected that a plan to phase out remaining tariffs 
will be a component of any trade agreement. 
Existing tariffs on a few selected categories of 
products are shown in Table 4. As indicated in this 
small sample, Canadian tariffs on a number of man-
ufactured goods are higher than those of the United 
States and, on average, are generally believed to be 
about twice as high. In this sense, Canada has more 
to give and relatively larger adjustments to make in 
a free trade deal. 
The case is much less clear in agriculture where 
tariffs appear to be more uniform between the two 
countries and in some instances higher in the U.S. 
than in Canada. This is illustrated with selected 
commodities in Table 5. One set of tariffs which 
remain important to Canadian interests are the sea-
sonal tariffs which apply to a number of horticul-
tural products during the peak marketing season. In 
general, however, tariffs are not considered to be a 
major issue for agriculture and their removal, while 
injurious to some, is not likely to have a large 
impact on trade flows. 
On the other hand, as noted by Menzie and Pren-
tice, non-tariff barriers such as import quotas, per-
mits, health regulations, grade standards, inspection 
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procedures and a host of government programs ha 
become relatively more important than tariffs   
 
restraints to trade in agriculture. Considerable ef     
fort is being applied by the negotiators to reduc the 
effect of many of these NTB's. In other cases 
relatively little change is expected. 
One example which appears to be somewhat of a 
stand-off are import quotas on dairy and poultry 
products entering Canada and dairy and sugar en-
tering the U.S. While there could be some adjust-
ments in these barriers, substantive changes are not 
anticipated at this point. 
The real issues for Canadian agricultural interests 
are those which affect other trade as well. First and 
foremost among these is the application of trade 
remedy laws such as countervail duties. Since 1980 
the application of countervail or other duties on 16 
items including live hogs, fish, softwood lumber, 
cut flowers, and a number of other products, 
sometimes on questionable grounds, has cost 
Canadian interests large sums of money and has 
shaken their confidence in trading with the U.S. 
Efforts to secure access to the U.S. market through 
exemption from trade remedy laws, or similar strong 
assurances, are thus a number one priority for Canada. 
This is a complex and difficult problem area 
which is clearly linked to the impact of non-tariff 
barriers in the form of government subsidy pro-
grams. One of the key steps in removing the un-
certainty associated with trade remedy laws is, 
therefore, an agreement on a clear definition of 
what constitutes a subsidy and what is counter-
vailable. The scope of this problem is, of course, 
much broader than that of bilateral trade between 
the U.S. and Canada. Fortunately, as evidenced by 
the recent OECD ministerial agreement
1 and other 
indicators, there is increasing recognition of the 
international impact of domestic agricultural 
policies. It is to be hoped that this will be accom-
panied by an increasing resolve to correct the dis-
tortions caused by these programs. 
The best opportunity for comprehensive action 
on this front is through the new round of GATT 
negotiations just getting underway. In the mean-
time, however, Canada and the U.S. may, and 
must, make some progress on defining counter-
vailable subsidies and restricting their applications 
on bilateral trade and in other markets where we 
have a common interest. 
One area where more work is needed is in the 
measurement of trade distortion and other impacts 
of agricultural subsidies. Indeed, it is the seemingly 
1 See "24 Western Nations Call trade-war truce." Ottawa Citizen, May 
14,  1987, p. F9. U.S.—Canada Trade Relationships     67 
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Table 5.    Canadian and U.S. Tariffs on Selected Agricultural Commodities 
  Canadian  
Product  Duty U.S. Duty
Milling Wheat  12 cts./bu.  21 cts./bu 
V/heat Flour  25 cts./cwt. 52 cts./cwt.
Com  5 cts./bu. 5 cts./bu.
Corn Oil (N.E.S.)  15.0% 4.0%
Soybeans  Free Free
Soybean Meal  Free 30 cts./cwt.
Soybean Oil (N.E.S.)  15.0% 22.5%
Canola  Free 40 cts/cwt.
Cattle (live)  1 ct./lb. I ct./lb.
Beef (fresh, chilled.     
frozen)  2 cts./lb. 2 cts./lb.
Hogs (live)  Free Free'
Pork (fresh, chilled.   
frozen)  Free Free
Chicken (eviscerated)  12.5% 5 cts/lb.
  (5-10 cts./lb.)  
Eggs (shell)  3.5 cts./doz.  3.5 cts./doz.
Cheese (Cheddar) 3.5 cts./fb. 12-16%
Potatoes (fresh)  35 cts./cwt. 35 cts./cwt.
Potatoes (processed)  Free 10%
Carrots (fresh)  0.5 cts./lb. for 0.5 cts./lb.
  up to 40 wks.  
  otherwise free  
Strawberries (fresh)  3.0 cts./lb., not less 0.2-0.75 cts./lb.
than 10% for 8 wks. depending on
  otherwise free date of entry.
Strawberries (frozen)  15% 14%
' Subject to countervail duty of 4.386 cts. Can. per Ib. since 1984. 
Source: Agriculture Canda, Tariffs on Selected Agricultural Products, Ottawa, June 1980. 
and 'Menzie, Elmer L. and Prentice, Barry E. Barriers to Trade Between Canada and the United States, IED Staff Report, ERS-USDA 
Washington, 1983. 
arbitrary applications of U.S. countervail duties on 
the basis of subsidies which has caused concern in 
Canada. The most recent, and perhaps most cele-
brated case is that of softwood lumber where the 
U.S. reversed its earlier decision (1983) and de-
cided that provincial pricing policy (stumpage fees) 
constituted a countervailable subsidy on Canadian 
lumber imports in 1986. (Wonnacott, pp. 91-101) 
But the U.S. imposition of a countervail duty on 
imports of live hogs from Canada also provides a 
clear example of the weakness of the system in 
failing to accommodate accurate economic analysis. 
Because of the importance of such cases, it is worth 
taking a closer look at this one on live hogs. Faced 
with low prices and increasing imports of hogs and 
pork from Canada, hog producers in the U.S. 
requested a study of the subsidization of hog 
production in Canada in 1984. Early in the process, it 
was estimated by Grimes on the basis of price 
flexibility analysis using assumed demand elastic-
ities, that the injury to U.S. producers from Ca-
nadian hog and pork imports was a price decrease 
ranging from one to 2.5%, ($1.93 to $4.80 per 
cwt. in 1984). The U.S. Department of Commerce 
added up the cost of Canadian stabilization pro-
grams, the federal grading service and a few other 
programs and divided by the number of hogs pro-
duced in Canada in 1983-84 in arriving at a rec-
ommended countervail duty of 5.52? per Ib. on 
pork and 4.390 per Ib. on live hogs. The final 
determination by the International Trade Commis-
sion maintained the duty on live hogs only. 
While the economic consequences for Canada 
could have been much more serious, more thor-
ough analysis of impact and injury to U.S. pro-
ducers have raised questions about the validity of 
the case in the first place. For example, Martin and 
Goddard have found that there has been very little 
supply response of Canadian hog producers to sta-
bilization programs and that any injury to U.S. hog 
producers as a result of these programs is more 
likely to be in the order of 150 per cwt. (0.30%) 
than the $1.93-4.80 per cwt. (1-2.5%) estimated by 
Grimes. These findings are supported by the work 
of Rowsel and Kenyon who similarly found little 
evidence of supply response to stabilization 68     October 1987 
program in Canada, and by that of Gilmour and 
Cluff who estimated the impact on U.S. hog prices to 
be in the order of 2 to 120 (U.S.) per cwt. of 
dressed carcass if Canadian stabilization programs 
were eliminated. It is the unreliability of the process 
with regard to economic analysis, and the uncertainty 
that it creates, that have prompted Canada to seek an 
improved mechanism for settling disputes as well 
as relief from the trade remedy laws of the U.S. 
While Canadian trade representatives have pub-
licly insisted that relief from trade remedy laws 
must be part of the deal, and U.S. trade repre-
sentatives have publicly insisted that would be im-
possible, there is likely to be some give and take 
on this issue. One possibility suggested by Won-
nacott that would provide a certain latitude for both 
governments to pursue selective policies (such as 
industrial grants for regional development in Can-
ada), would be to raise the threshold values (de 
minimas) at which countervail duties may be ap-
plied. At the present time, these could be imposed if 
the amount of subsidy is found to exceed 0.5% of 
the value of the product. That threshold could be 
raised to anywhere from 2 to 5% to provide a 
margin of shelter without appreciably distorting 
trade. 
The economic and political climate surrounding 
these talks is worthy of comment because of its 
effects on the motivation and feasibility of reaching a 
satisfactory outcome. As already noted, the talks 
were initiated by Canada, but public support for 
these talks is by no means universal, generally 
ranging around 45 to 55% of these polled, de-
pending on the timing of the survey. Support also 
differs by region in Canada with the east generally 
less in favor than the west. This reflects the feeling 
that most of the benefits of Canada's current trade 
laws are concentrated in the manufacturing indus-
tries of Ontario and the relatively greater impor-
tance of export oriented resource industries in 
Western Canada. 
These features, in addition to the overall im-
portance of trade to the Canadian economy, have 
given the talks a very high profile in Canada. Media 
coverage often echoes the deep rooted Canadian 
concern of American dominance by virtue of sheer 
size and indifference toward Canadian interest. (That 
concern was aptly described by former Prime Min-
ister Trudeau when he declared, a few years ago, 
that living beside the U.S. was a bit like sleeping 
with an elephant—"no matter how good natured 
the beast, one is inclined to feel every twitch and 
grunt." Wonnacott, p. 2) 
These conditions are important in that they im- 
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pose certain constraints on the maneuverability of 
the Canadian government. That maneuverability ic 
further impaired by the political influence and ju-
risdiction of the provincial governments, some of 
which have expressed reservations and all of which 
have demanded a consultative role in the talks. In 
response to provincial and industry concern, the 
federal government has established a formal ad-
visory committee system for consultative purposes 
All of this increases the difficulty and complexity 
of the negotiating process. 
Canadian sensitivity on the trade talks has long 
been present as reflected in the failure of previous 
efforts. In 1911, after negotiating an agreement and 
campaigning in favour of reciprocity with the U.S., 
the Liberal government of Sir Wilfred Laurier was 
defeated at the polls. The succeeding Conservative 
government never implemented the agreement. In 
1948, again after a comprehensive trade agreement 
had been negotiated with the U.S. that would have 
eliminated tariffs and opened up other trade re-
strictions, Prime Minister Mackenzie King de-
cided the risks were too great to proceed with 
approval and implementation. 
An earlier reciprocity treaty for free trade in natural 
products, negotiated in 1854 while Canada was still a 
British colony, was abrogated by the U.S. in 1866 
in retaliation for British support for the Confederate 
states during the Civil War. After Canada became a 
country in 1867, several other attempts were made 
to negotiate a reciprocity treaty. Failure of this 
effort in 1874 was followed by a period of 
increased protectionism in Canada. So the records 
of history do not offer much promise of success in 
Canada-U.S. trade negotiations. 
On a more positive note, however, the auto pact 
negotiated in 1965 is regarded as having been good 
for both countries and now accounts for a very 
large part of Canada-U.S. trade. Indeed, trade under 
the auto-pact alone accounts for some 7 percent of 
Canadian GNP. This explains why Canada is 
concerned about possible changes in this agree-
ment. 
In terms of current economic environment, it is a 
difficult time to be negotiating a trade agreement. 
Economic growth is sluggish, both countries are 
struggling with large budget deficits and the U.S. 
faces a record trade deficit. As noted by Reisman, it 
is traditionally in difficult economic times that 
Canada seeks improved trade access while the U.S. 
usually reacts by becoming more protectionistic. 
(Wonnacott p. 58) This time around, the growing 
protectionism in the U.S. is accompanied by much 
more aggressive subsidization of exports, at least 
for agricultural products. Coffin 
Despite their importance to both countries, ag-
ricultural problems are neither the driving force nor 
the central issue in the current trade talks. Indeed, 
many people would not have been surprised if ag-
riculture had been excluded from the bilateral talks. 
Because of the complexity of agricultural policies 
on both sides of the border, this potential outcome 
was recognized by the Hon. Donald Macdonald, 
Chairman of the Royal Commission which recom-
mended the trade talks.
2 More recently, recognizing 
the importance of price support programs, the 
difficulty of harmonizing domestic agricultural pol-
icies, and the overwhelming impact of the Common 
Agricultural Policy of the European Community on 
both Canada and the U.S., Wonnacott (p. 29) 
acknowledges, with respect to the bilateral talks 
that, "The strongest case for exception can be made 
in agriculture." 
It should be no surprise then that the chief ne-
gotiators (Reisman and Murphy) have identified 
agriculture as one of "the most difficult issues" in 
the talks.
3 Despite these difficulties and reserva-
tions about importance and feasibility of negoti-
ating an agreement in agriculture, it appears that 
there may be some progress in reducing trade bar-
riers, and perhaps on defining subsidization aspects 
of domestic agricultural policy. 
Impact of Free Trade 
What, then, would be the impact of freer trade in the 
event that such an agreement is reached? A few 
studies have been conducted which provide some 
insight in this regard. First of all, it is worth re-
minding ourselves of the principal sources of gain 
from further trade liberalization in this case. The 
first of these, probably the best known and most 
often cited by proponents of free trade, and the least 
important in this case, are the efficiency gains 
associated with the specialization of production ac-
cortting to the principle of comparative advantage. 
Potential gains from more efficient allocation of 
resources may be impressive when comparing free 
trade with a no-trade situation, when resources are 
fully employed in two countries with very different 
resource endowments and when products trade in 
perfectly competitive markets but when these re-
sources cannot, themselves, be traded. This does 
2 Remarks by Hon. Donald Macdonald during luncheon address to the 
Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Montreal, 1985 (Response to 
question from author). 
3 "Latest talks on Trade solved little, say official" The Ottawa Citizen, 
April 30/87. 
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not describe the context of freer trade between Canada 
and the U.S. and the potential gains from more 
efficient resource allocation in this case are not 
impressive. Indeed, citing two studies which pro-
duce conflicting results on which country would 
gain and which one would lose under these con-
ditions, Wonnacott concludes that, in the absence 
of economies of scale, the gains from bilateral free 
trade between Canada and the U.S. would most 
likely be less than 1% of GNP in either case. 
So it is economies of scale, then, that offers the 
greatest potential for gains from freer bilateral trade 
between Canada and the U.S. Having the smaller 
market and the smaller plants, Canada stands to 
gain the most in cases where economies of scale 
are important. These gains might be only partially 
offset by the removal of the higher tariff structure in 
Canada, and by the conduct and performance of 
firms in concentrated market structures. Indeed, 
according to an empirical analysis by Harris and 
Cox (1984) which allowed for economies of scale, 
the Canadian gain from freer trade with the U.S. 
was estimated at up to 9% of GNP. In a later study, 
Harris (1985) identified the winners and losers by 
sector: the textiles and clothing sectors would ex-
perience the largest increase in production followed 
by the paper, rubber, knitting, tobacco and trans-
portation equipment sectors; production would 
probably decrease 10-20% in the furniture, agri-
cultural and non-agricultural equipment sectors and 
could go either way in chemicals, electrical equip-
ment, food and beverage manufacturing, and several 
other sectors. Lower employment was predicted for 
food and beverages and a number of other sectors. 
In a study for the Economic Council of Canada, 
Magum came to a similar conclusion for the food 
and beverage sector, forecasting no change greater 
than 2.5% in either direction. Assuming constant 
returns to scale, Brown and Stern forecast a re-
duction of at least $15 million in output in the 
Canadian food and beverage sector as a result of 
free trade with the United States. 
So the results of the general equilibrium analysis 
appear to be somewhat mixed. While it seems that 
the Canadian economy in total would gain if econ-
omies of scale are important, it also appears that 
the major gains would be concentrated in relatively 
few sectors. This raises questions about how those 
gains from trade will be distributed and whether 
the losers might expect to be compensated. 
For the food and beverage manufacturing sector, it 
appears that there is just as much, if not more, 
likelihood of loss as of gain from freer trade. But 
the change in either direction may not be large. In 70     October  1987                  NJARE
      
the final analysis, it will be the competitiveness of 
the sector and its ability to adjust that will determine 
the direction and amount of change. 
There are at least two indicators that may not 
bode well for the competitiveness of the Canadian 
food and beverage sector. The first of these is pro-
ductivity. According to Salem (1987b) multifactor 
(capital, labour, and energy) productivity in the food 
and beverage sector has declined at an average rate of 
.03% in Canada from 1978-82 while that of the U.S. 
industry grew  at an average annual rate of 1.34%. 
Lanoie observed the same phenomenon over the 
period of 1972-81 with respect to labour 
productivity in the food and beverage sector. He 
noted that, after adjusting for exchange rates, the 
value added per hour in Canada declined from 78% 
of that in the U.S. in 1972 to 69% of the U.S. level 
in 1981 with wage rates virtually the same in both 
countries. 
Another indicator of competitiveness in the agri-
food sector is plant size. With average plant size 
across the entire sector in the U.S. more than twice 
that in Canada, the U.S. industry should currently 
have an important edge if economies of scale are 
important. (Table 6). Of course, access to larger 
markets might permit Canadian plants ot expand 
and become more efficient. 
Ironically, according to Salem (1987b), the in-
dustry in both countries is demonstrating decreasing 
returns to scale, more so in the U.S. than in Canada. 
(Perhaps small is beautiful in this case!) 
Table 6.    Plant Size  
Average Value of Shipments by Establishment 
in Selected Food and Beverage Industries in 
Canada and the U.S. 1982 
  Canada            U.S. 
  (1972 $Can.)(1972 $U.S.)    
Industry  Millions         Millions     (U.S. /Canada) 
Slaughtering and   
Meat Processors  6.97                8.67                1.53
Poultry Processors  5.39              12.68                2.89
Fruit and Vegetable   
Canners  3.0                  6.03                2.47
Freezers  5.11                 8.70                2.09
Dairy Products  4.56                6.93                1.87
Breweries  12.63              59.23                5.77
Total — Food &   
Beverage  2.79                6.22                2.74
Source: C. Lanoie, "Comparison of the Canadian and United 
States Food and Beverage Industries, Market Commentary, Vol. 
7 No. 3 Agriculture Canada, Ottawa, p. 45. 
^/ U.S.  Shipments are converted to Canadian Dollars by an 
exchange rate of 1.23 before dividing by Canadian sales. 
 
Table 7.    International Orientation of Food 
and Beverage Industries of Canada and the 
United States, 1982 
 
 
Exports As % of 
Shipments 
 
Imports As %  
of Domestic    
Supply. 
Industry  Canada      U.S. Canada        U.S.
Red Meats  13.0         3.4    5.2           3.7 
Fruits & Vegetables 13.7         3.3 27.2             4.3 
Dairy Products 5.0          1.2  1.8             1.6
Flour & Breakfast  
Cereal Products 25.0         1.0  4.8             0.2
Distilleries 45.3         3.3 27.4           25.3
Breweries    8.3          0.3  0.8             4.2
Total — Food & Beverages 12.6         4.0
(Excluding Fish)     (9.2)               8.7             3.5 
Source: C. Lanoie. "Comparison of the Canadian and United 
States Food and Beverage Industries" Market Commentary Vol. 
7 No. 3 Agriculture Canada, Ottawa, p. 50. 
This raises doubts about this source of gain from 
free trade in the food industry. 
Competitiveness of the Canadian food and bev-
erage manufacturing sector may also be judged on 
the basis of its orientation and exposure to inter-
national markets. On this basis, it comes off quite 
well with respect to the U.S. For example, in 1982, 
12.6% of the value of shipments from Canadian 
plants was exported compared to only 4% in the 
U.S. On the other side of the ledger, imports of 
processed food and beverages represented 8.7% of 
the value of consumption in Canada versus 3.5% 
in the U.S. (Table 7). In both countries, the food 
and beverage sector as a whole is relatively more 
isolated from international markets than the average 
for the total manufacturing sector in terms of the 
relationship between production and trade volumes.  Ratio^
A few other observations and comparisons on 
the food and beverage sector in both countries may 
be of interest in anticipating performance under 
freer trade. First, the industry is much more con-
centrated in Canada with a weighted average CR4 
of 51.8% in 1978 versus 20-25% in the U.S. (La-
noie). To the extent that freer trade means more 
competition, performance might be expected to im-
prove in the longer term. Secondly, foreign control 
of the industry is much higher in Canada (28%) 
than in the U.S. (5%), and most of that control 
(76%) is held by U.S. interests. Are we facing the 
likelihood of branch plant closures in Canada as 
trade barriers are lowered? This is a question that 
needs further study. 
As a further measure of the role of large, foreign- Coffin 
controlled firms in Canadian trade, it is reported by 
Harris (1985) that in 1978, 72% of imports were to 
foreign controlled firms and 50% of all imports were 
accounted for by 50 firms, 35 of which were foreign 
controlled. This degree of mtra-corporate trade raises 
questions about the extent to which market forces 
will be reflected in the distribution of gains from 
freer trade in Canada. 
Competitiveness at the farm level in Quebec has 
been examined by Proulx (1986), using the following 
definition: 
To be competitive, a group of firms in a given sector, must 
be able to sell their products at a price equal to or less than 
the competition and, with that price, to remunerate resources 
not less than the competition, without recourse to 
government support greater than that of the competition.
4 
Proulx added the further criteria of maintaining or 
increasing market share, and maintaining or im-
proving the trade balance in that product. He found 
that, with the exception of poultry and eggs, Quebec 
agriculture performed very well, both with respect 
to the rest of Canada as well as the United States. 
But he also found that a number of the products in 
which Quebec could be competitive were those 
which the U.S. tends to overproduce and that there 
would be little opportunity for expanded markets. 
At the same time, the increased instability from 
being more integrated into the U.S. and other 
international markets, coupled with the growing 
tendency of the U.S. to subsidize its agriculture, 
raised serious doubts about the potential of net 
social gain from freer trade with the U.S. 
A study released by the Ontario Ministry of Ag-
riculture and Food also finds little to cheer about in 
the prospects of free trade in the agri-food sector. 
While acknowledging some potential opportunities 
for increased production and the gains to consumers 
from lower prices, the report observes that the 
potential gains are limited and that adjustment costs 
could be significant. The sectors identified as facing 
the largest adjustments at both the farm and 
processing level would be dairy, poultry, eggs, fruit 
and vegetable, wineries and breweries. 
Even in Western Canada, where support for the 
free trade initiative has been strongest, the prospects 
for gain are apparently modest insofar as agriculture 
is concerned. It has been estimated that production 
would increase 1% and farm cash receipts by $60 
million by 1995 under free trade with the United 
States, (Deloite, Haskins and Sells). The gains, 
concentrated heavily in beef and canola 
4 Translation from french text by author. 
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would tend to be offset by losses in poultry and feed 
grains. 
Summary and Conclusions 
What can we conclude from this rather sweeping 
treatment of Canada-U.S. trade relationships? The 
main points are summarized below. 
1.  Canadian-U. S. trade relationships have been 
changing in a variety of ways. The volume of 
trade has been growing rapidly in both 
directions and Canadian dependence on U.S. 
markets has been increasing. But our trade 
relations have been deteriorating. Growing 
U.S. protectionism is evidenced by 16 trade 
actions taken against Canada since 1980, and 
others still pending. 
2.  Inspired by the fear of losing part of the U.S. 
market due to indiscriminate application of 
contingency protection, Canada initiated the 
bilateral trade talks with the U.S. in 1985. 
The Canadian objectives of those talks are 
secure access, enhanced access and  en-
shrinement of access to the U.S. market. 
3. There may be an opportunity for gain through 
exploitation of economies of scale under free 
trade with the U.S. but most of the gain will 
be concentrated in a few sectors. This raises 
questions about the distribution of those gains 
in a highly concentrated and foreign con-
trolled manufacturing sector. Moreover, there 
is evidence of decreasing returns to scale in 
food manufacturing. 
4.  The potential gains in the agriculture and food 
sector appear to be quite modest and may well 
be non-existent due to reduced production in 
several industries. The largest adjustment under 
a complete free trade agreement would be 
poultry, dairy and some parts of the hor-
ticultural industry. Complete free trade is un-
likely to happen but removal of tariffs and 
reductions in non-tariff barriers are expected. 
5.  Further work is needed in measuring the gains 
from trade under conditions that reflect actual 
market conditions of excess resources and im-
perfect markets. Work is also needed on the 
trade distortion effects of government poli-
cies and definition of countervailable subsi-
dies. Both of these will be useful for the GATT 
negotiations as well as in the bilateral context. 
6. Given the current depressed state of agricul-
ture in both countries, freer bilateral trade 72    October 1987 
will do little to improve the situation. The best, 
if not the only, hope for resolving global 
agricultural trade problems lies in the forth-
coming round of GATT negotiations. Any 
progress that can be made in improving trade 
relations between Canada and the U.S. will be 
important to the growth and efficiency of the 
agri-food sector in both countries. But we 
should not expect too much. 
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